This semester has been a journey into the nature and issues surrounding new media, or more accurately, new digital media. Whether it is the Internet, cell phones, digital video, wired networks, or wi-fi, we have attempted to define it, its issues, and its impact on individuals and society. This has been accomplished through varied readings of the current scholars in cyber-studies. My first observation is that, as a whole, the authors have been advocates of the cyber-utopian view that digital technologies will cure the ills of society. From increased citizen participation in the democratic process to equality and social justice for under-represented ethnic and social communities, digital media, and its accompanying technologies will free the masses. With the advantage of 20/20 hindsight (may of these books were published in the late 1990s and early 2000s, ancient times in cyber-history), we have seen that this early utopian view has not come to fruition and in some cases it has actually increase the gap between information haves and have-nots.
It is this point, "access", that has been a major theme through much of the readings and the subsequent class discussions. What we have seen is that access is a multifaceted issue and not the simplistic hardware and technology issue of early Internet policy debates. Leah A. Lievrouw’s essay in Media Access (eds. Bucy & Newhagen, 2004) does an admirable job of bringing the various issues and hypothesizing about access into her model of the information environment (p. 274). It attempts to show how the various dynamics of technology and infrastructure, content, uses and gratification, relevance, individual cognitive ability, usage and non-usage, social organization and culture (among many other variables) work together—or at odds with one another—to facilitate or hinder an individuals access to new media. Simplistic in its design, the model helps to illustrate the process of information acquisition, a process that is valid regardless of the media being “new” or traditional. A point that brings me back to my often-trumpeted claim that new media is subject to the same processes, theories, issues, accolades, and faults as any communication medium—newspapers, radio, or television. A quick review of my previous blog entries shows my question of the semester, “why does it continually surprise the scholars, policy experts and the public when digital media acts like the previous mass media and not in their utopian vision?” Digital media is a tool for communication, whether its machine-to-machine, human-to-machine, or human-to-human it is still just a tool—granted a very cool tool.
However, here is where I say that maybe there is sometime different about new digital media. My professor, Lance Porter, asked more than once, “Is there something inherently different about new media?” I have usually been one of the first to say “no,” it is not different just quicker. Now though I wish to explore a different line of thought, inspired this weeks reading, Society Online (Howard & Jones, 2004), and Neil Postman’s Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985)—read for another course I took this semester. In his essay, Steve Jones discusses the rise of the computer networks and the “network” metaphor for almost any connected entity—“religion, science, politics, and medicine—indeed, the gamut of human and natural behaviors—can be viewed from a network perspective” (cited Barabási, p. 327). He goes on to discuss how the increase in network speeds is quickly making instantaneous communication a reality. Jones quotes Tom DeFanti, co-director of the Electronic Visualization Lab at the University of Illinois at Chicago, who envisions a time when networked immersive virtual reality devices will allow individuals located at various locations to meet at a time and a place of their choosing—a technology that creates a virtual space that is “better than being there.” The instantaneous nature of the technology is nearly already here—emails sent whenever from where ever, cell phones and sat phones that allow constant voice, text and data access from anywhere in the world, and searching and information at “your finger tips” via the Internet. It is this instantaneousness of the technology that makes me wonder what the impact will be on society.
The breaking-up of time from space, makes me wonder about unexpected consequences. What could happen if one no longer needed to go anywhere, because the technology let you be anywhere at anytime and in any time—past, present, or future? Postman cites Lewis Mumford (Technics and Civilization, 1934), that the invention of the clock [a new technology in the 14th century] had “the effect of disassociating time from human events.” It changed how people thought about time and space, and things and processes. Mumford argues that this invention, nurtured the belief of “an independent world of mathematically measurable sequences,” and diminished the role of God and nature in man’s machinery timed world. It separated man from the natural elements of sun and seasons, now we are at the cusp of further separating man now from the natural environment of “place” or location. People will not only be “disassociating” time, but also “place” from human events.
My intention here is not to be a naysayer, but to only say maybe we should think of the possible consequences of everything and anything being instantaneously available—information, data, conversation, entertainment, etc… American society loves cool new stuff with little forethought to its negative implications. Hype and marketing will never let us forget to the benefits to society this next "new thing" will bring, but little attention is paid to problems. It seems that we, as a society, have become more rude, dissatisfied, and impatient because of our current near-instantaneous technology of cell phone and email. People can initiate contact with another at a moments notice and they expect near instantaneous reply, regardless of the other persons situation. If people get instant gratification in the digital world, how will they deal will the “mañana” reality of the physical world? What will come next?
Postman suggests that each new medium brought with it new and unexpected consequences to human thought and behavior. Speech brought rhetorical conversation, print allowed more thoughtful and deliberate discourse, and television trivialized ideas, so only time will tell what impact to thought, and discourse new digital technologies will bring to or have on society. As an optimist, I believe time, innovation, unexpected uses (popular culture), market competition, and unpredictable humans (resistant communities) will moderate or solve the problems, difficulties, and quarks presented by new media, just as they have with all previous media.
Person note: When I signed up for this class I thought, "great a new media course for my first semester, I can have an easy course in my comfort zone." I was wrong, this course has allowed me and forced me to challenge, explore, and probe my preconceived notions of new media. I suspect, like many in the class, I though of new media in turns of technology, design, hardware, and economics. This class has opened my eyes to a new field of inquiry, critical cultural studies. More than any other graduate (masters) course I have taken in the past, this class has expanded my vision to further my scholarship of exploring new media, political communication and its impacts.
Thought Paper: November 15
Kathryn Montgomery’s Generation Digital (2007) is a walk down memory-lane. It is amazing that the events of less than ten years ago are now footnotes in the history of digital media. How relevant is discussing Bolt.com as a social networking model when now Facebook and MySpace dominate the cyberscape, and even at the time, teens preferred the chat rooms and IM'ing on AOL? Even the competition was not the total demise for Bolt.com, video and music sharing actually killed them (copyright infringement). How relevant is it to consider all children in this discourse, pre-teens (Barbie.com) to nearly 18-somethings (Rock the Vote). As a society, the nearly-adults have always been given more freedom—working, driving, and more freedom to make personal choices—and pre-teens and early teens have always been more protected and afforded less personal freedom. Why would or should their freedom of action be different in the Internet environment? In the offline world of television, marketing companies, advertising companies, and product producers (toys, cereal, or tobacco) have been restricted on what they can promote to children, why should companies be granted unrestricted access just because it is the new digital world. Of course, big business wanted to keep the Internet unregulated, they saw dollars—huge amounts of dollars—from this un-exploited kid market, but society has always restricted their access to kids. Just because the technology is new and different, does not change the concept of society protecting children.
I tend to err on the side of “freedoms” and less regulation, but in hindsight, COPPA seems to have done more good than harm. Now companies seem to be erring on the side of caution for fear of penalties or further government oversight or legislation. One could even argue that other forces, such as the Internet-bubble burst of the late 1990s and music industry lawsuits over kid website’s p2p capabilities, have dampened the enthusiasm to develop and operate kid-oriented sites. Is COPPA the best legislation to protect children—the vulnerable pre-teens and early teens—and still allow the free movement of information and ideas? Probably not, but for now it works. Moreover, with everything dealing with digital media, COPPA will soon be irrelevant, as technology and usage will leave it behind. I disagree with Montgomery, this new digital age is not redefining childhood; it is redefining our concept of regulation. Regulation involving digital media should not be ironclad legislation—once it is enacted, it is nearly impossible to change—but should be time-limited acts that are designed to be debated from time-to-time to enable the regulations to keep pace with technology and usage.
On a personal note, I have found this book to be the most uninteresting, what’s-the-point book we have had to read—history without insight or worse, out-of-date and irrelevant insight. Business—targeting products to kids, mining personal and private family information from children and children's unrestricted access to porn—are bad, regulations to protect children—COPPA—are appropriate, and parents using measures to impede the viewing of “harmful” content—talking with their kids about the Internet, and using NetNanny or CyberPatrol—are good. If parents (of course, I have no children) took a more active roll in monitoring their children’s digital activities and established guideline of appropriate disclosure and participation much of the “harm to children” debate would be moot. Unfortunately, as in the offline world, many parents want society to be responsible for bring up their children.
I tend to err on the side of “freedoms” and less regulation, but in hindsight, COPPA seems to have done more good than harm. Now companies seem to be erring on the side of caution for fear of penalties or further government oversight or legislation. One could even argue that other forces, such as the Internet-bubble burst of the late 1990s and music industry lawsuits over kid website’s p2p capabilities, have dampened the enthusiasm to develop and operate kid-oriented sites. Is COPPA the best legislation to protect children—the vulnerable pre-teens and early teens—and still allow the free movement of information and ideas? Probably not, but for now it works. Moreover, with everything dealing with digital media, COPPA will soon be irrelevant, as technology and usage will leave it behind. I disagree with Montgomery, this new digital age is not redefining childhood; it is redefining our concept of regulation. Regulation involving digital media should not be ironclad legislation—once it is enacted, it is nearly impossible to change—but should be time-limited acts that are designed to be debated from time-to-time to enable the regulations to keep pace with technology and usage.
On a personal note, I have found this book to be the most uninteresting, what’s-the-point book we have had to read—history without insight or worse, out-of-date and irrelevant insight. Business—targeting products to kids, mining personal and private family information from children and children's unrestricted access to porn—are bad, regulations to protect children—COPPA—are appropriate, and parents using measures to impede the viewing of “harmful” content—talking with their kids about the Internet, and using NetNanny or CyberPatrol—are good. If parents (of course, I have no children) took a more active roll in monitoring their children’s digital activities and established guideline of appropriate disclosure and participation much of the “harm to children” debate would be moot. Unfortunately, as in the offline world, many parents want society to be responsible for bring up their children.
Thought Paper: November 8
Lawrence Lessig’s Free Culture is an interesting presentation on “the nature and future of creativity” in a digital age. Although the book is about intellectual property, the point seems to be that Congress has been corrupted by the powerful (big media concerns) and that we live in a litigious society (hundred thousand dollar lawsuits against twelve year old girls). It is a situation where the threat of litigation acts more effectively that the actual regulations that govern society’s activities. It is an environment that rewards “deep pockets” and corporate agendas, regardless of the truth or righteousness of the cause.
He studies how the use of copyright’s ever expanding legislation and aggressive litigation by corporations to unilaterally protect copyrighted material has created a tyrannical environment that threatens to destroy free and creative culture. Lessig argues that Congress has overstepped its authority by continuing the extend copyright term limits—now at life plus 70 years for creators or 95 years for corporate ownership. These extensions renders moot the public domain of non-copyrighted material that can be expanded upon to create new culture—for the most part only material produced prior to 1923 is part of the public domain. I find this argument a bit flawed; Lessig gives examples of old out-of-publication books that can not be made into movies, music that can not be sampled to create new musical pieces, and out-of-circulation films without commercial value that sit and rot in movie canisters, but he ignores the artists, filmmakers, authors and musicians that constantly creating new creative content. I am not suggesting that these are good situations, but Lessig is oversimplifying the situation.
On litigation, he almost pardons the actions of the RIAA and MPAA in their vigorous litigations against average citizens and corporate infringers. He says that of course older companies will attempt to stop new competitors from gaining a foothold in their industry, it is their right and duty to do so. It is Congress’ corruptibility to corporate power and money that has created overly protectionist, knee-jerk copyright legislation. In addition, it is the politicization of the judiciary (he recently lost a Supreme Court decision, Eldred vs. Ashcroft—this book almost seems like a rant about that fact) and that is allowing the continued threat free culture. I find it odd that Lessig—he teaches Constitutional law at Stanford—was naive enough to think that politics do not affect legal decisions, even Supreme Court decisions.
A couple of other things begin to come to mind:
Lessig does offer a couple of solutions to what he perceives as the problem of over regulation of copyrights and the diminishing public domain. First, he suggests a reinstatement of registering and renewing copyright protect, in this way, only product with immediate commercial value would remain protected, and the rest would revert to public domain status. The second solution is Creative Commons; it is a pseudo-public domain where the creator allows various fair uses of their creative property. The first will take political will (doubtful) and the second is a personal initiative (if the artist cares).
I have taken a bit of a cynical view of Lessig's work, not because I do not agree with Lessig, I actually do for the most part. I buy into the idea that the big bad corporation will use its power, money and influence to affect legislation, that Congress will find the pro business-as-usual protect us from the big, dark digital unknown an attractive argument (campaign donations welcome) and the courts will rule based of political and commercial concerns (who really cares what the Constitution actually says). I agree with Lessig that the copyright, as it now stands, protects large commercial interests (Mickey Mouses of the world) without regard to the actual artist or the consequences of the over-reaching regulations. I agree that digital technologies have radically changing the old status-quot of the entertainment industry, but market conditions, not protectionist legislation should sort out the playing field. I just think that, even with the regulatory and legal obstacles, the new and innovative uses of the digital technology by the creator of creative products will out pace the tactics of big brother (corporate and governmental).
He studies how the use of copyright’s ever expanding legislation and aggressive litigation by corporations to unilaterally protect copyrighted material has created a tyrannical environment that threatens to destroy free and creative culture. Lessig argues that Congress has overstepped its authority by continuing the extend copyright term limits—now at life plus 70 years for creators or 95 years for corporate ownership. These extensions renders moot the public domain of non-copyrighted material that can be expanded upon to create new culture—for the most part only material produced prior to 1923 is part of the public domain. I find this argument a bit flawed; Lessig gives examples of old out-of-publication books that can not be made into movies, music that can not be sampled to create new musical pieces, and out-of-circulation films without commercial value that sit and rot in movie canisters, but he ignores the artists, filmmakers, authors and musicians that constantly creating new creative content. I am not suggesting that these are good situations, but Lessig is oversimplifying the situation.
On litigation, he almost pardons the actions of the RIAA and MPAA in their vigorous litigations against average citizens and corporate infringers. He says that of course older companies will attempt to stop new competitors from gaining a foothold in their industry, it is their right and duty to do so. It is Congress’ corruptibility to corporate power and money that has created overly protectionist, knee-jerk copyright legislation. In addition, it is the politicization of the judiciary (he recently lost a Supreme Court decision, Eldred vs. Ashcroft—this book almost seems like a rant about that fact) and that is allowing the continued threat free culture. I find it odd that Lessig—he teaches Constitutional law at Stanford—was naive enough to think that politics do not affect legal decisions, even Supreme Court decisions.
A couple of other things begin to come to mind:
- Lessig is not just pointing out the problems with creative or intellectual property, but he is railing against societal problems regardless of technology or creative product.
- I wonder if the digital technology that caused the music industry to promote the protectionist legislation, will in fact render that “threat to free culture” a moot point. Has not the model of musicians self-publishing via the Internet (Radiohead), begun to circumvent the strangle hold the RIAA has on the music industry. Even with the draconian regulations of copyright and technology, is it not possible that the market will fix itself?
Lessig does offer a couple of solutions to what he perceives as the problem of over regulation of copyrights and the diminishing public domain. First, he suggests a reinstatement of registering and renewing copyright protect, in this way, only product with immediate commercial value would remain protected, and the rest would revert to public domain status. The second solution is Creative Commons; it is a pseudo-public domain where the creator allows various fair uses of their creative property. The first will take political will (doubtful) and the second is a personal initiative (if the artist cares).
I have taken a bit of a cynical view of Lessig's work, not because I do not agree with Lessig, I actually do for the most part. I buy into the idea that the big bad corporation will use its power, money and influence to affect legislation, that Congress will find the pro business-as-usual protect us from the big, dark digital unknown an attractive argument (campaign donations welcome) and the courts will rule based of political and commercial concerns (who really cares what the Constitution actually says). I agree with Lessig that the copyright, as it now stands, protects large commercial interests (Mickey Mouses of the world) without regard to the actual artist or the consequences of the over-reaching regulations. I agree that digital technologies have radically changing the old status-quot of the entertainment industry, but market conditions, not protectionist legislation should sort out the playing field. I just think that, even with the regulatory and legal obstacles, the new and innovative uses of the digital technology by the creator of creative products will out pace the tactics of big brother (corporate and governmental).
Thought Paper: November 1
I like Henry Jenkins’ explanation of convergence, in his book Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, as “a word that manages to describe technological, industrial, cultural, and social changes…” I especially like that he does not implicitly link convergence with technological advance, though he does not stray too far from the “new technology’ fold. What he has done is open the door to view convergence from a social, humanist, or communication perspective. I have the feeling that he would be comfortable in Boorstin’s discussion of the “fluidity of existence”, the process in which a printed book becomes a movie, the movie is broadcast on television, the movie’s soundtrack becomes a record album, and the album is broadcast over the radio. Though unlike Boorstin, Jenkins would not lament the occurrence, but except it as a natural evolution of technologies and communication needs. Jenkins states, “Convergence does not depend on any specific delivery mechanism. Rather…a move from media-specific content toward content that flows across multiple media channels…”
It is the clash of cultures—corporate and public—that hold the key to understanding convergence culture. The same-old-content-over-new-and-different-technology-channels discussion will never be able to fully explore convergence. Only when you examine the point of resistance between the media elite and the public, will the true potential of convergence be realized. The example of Gore’s Current television network could be a great case study to examine this New Media clash of resistant communities in the model of Don Mitchell’s (youth culture redefining the mall space), Stuart Hall’s (individuals as producers and consumers of culture) and Mikhail Bakhtin’s (Rabelais and His World—carnival) work. Will the participatory public accept the wealth white guy’s “alternative” media network? Moreover, if they do, will “corporate media” co-opt them and their product?
It will be at the point of resistance between corporate commercial interests and the mass' desires where the public will decide how they will best utilize the more-accessible media content and information. It will be this struggle between the public—using the technology in new and inventive ways—and the media/corporate/government elite—dictating a commercialized top-down usage scheme—that will reveal the future of convergence. As Jenkins stated, convergence is the “…ever more complex relations between top-down corporate media and bottom-up participatory culture.” More than old and new media colliding as the title suggests, it will be the age-old colliding of popular culture and elitist culture that defines Convergence Culture.
Although I feel Jenkins at times falls into the Cyber-utopia trap—from new technology will dawn a glorious new participatory democracy—he does posits some interesting ideas. His acceptance of social and cultural dynamics at play within the discourse of technological convergence is refreshing. In addition, his questioning and critic of Gore’s business model for Current and its alleged purpose of “democratizing” television, is thoughtful and worthy of additional research.
It is the clash of cultures—corporate and public—that hold the key to understanding convergence culture. The same-old-content-over-new-and-different-technology-channels discussion will never be able to fully explore convergence. Only when you examine the point of resistance between the media elite and the public, will the true potential of convergence be realized. The example of Gore’s Current television network could be a great case study to examine this New Media clash of resistant communities in the model of Don Mitchell’s (youth culture redefining the mall space), Stuart Hall’s (individuals as producers and consumers of culture) and Mikhail Bakhtin’s (Rabelais and His World—carnival) work. Will the participatory public accept the wealth white guy’s “alternative” media network? Moreover, if they do, will “corporate media” co-opt them and their product?
It will be at the point of resistance between corporate commercial interests and the mass' desires where the public will decide how they will best utilize the more-accessible media content and information. It will be this struggle between the public—using the technology in new and inventive ways—and the media/corporate/government elite—dictating a commercialized top-down usage scheme—that will reveal the future of convergence. As Jenkins stated, convergence is the “…ever more complex relations between top-down corporate media and bottom-up participatory culture.” More than old and new media colliding as the title suggests, it will be the age-old colliding of popular culture and elitist culture that defines Convergence Culture.
Although I feel Jenkins at times falls into the Cyber-utopia trap—from new technology will dawn a glorious new participatory democracy—he does posits some interesting ideas. His acceptance of social and cultural dynamics at play within the discourse of technological convergence is refreshing. In addition, his questioning and critic of Gore’s business model for Current and its alleged purpose of “democratizing” television, is thoughtful and worthy of additional research.
Thought Paper: October 25
The Commercialization of a Dream: How the American way usurps idealism.
This week’s paper has been inspired by two of the readings from Critical Cyberculture Studies (Eds. Silver & Massanari, 2006), Fred Turner’s essay “How Digital Technology Found Utopian Ideology: Lessons from the First Hackers’ Conference,” and Gina Neff’s “ Associating Independents: Business Relationships and the Culture of Independence in the Dot-Com Era.” Turner explores the development of utopian information ideology by examining hackers of the 1970s and 1980s and the events of the 1984 Hackers’ Conference. The media myth of hackers is that they are loners and late-night prowlers, additionally they are portrayed as warriors in fight between commercialization of information, software and the Internet and the “Free software” movement or as I know it the “Open source” movement—Linux (OS) and Sakai (collaboration software) are current examples). Based on the six values of the hacker ethic (Levy, Steven. 1984. Hackers: Heroes of the computer revolution), early hackers began the creation of a utopian view of their work
These early hackers were primarily working for major research institutes as MIT and Stanford. I would suggest that it is easy of promote the free diffusion of technology when you are employed by a university and funded by government grants.
Not all feel into the “Free software” camp, Turner points out that Macintosh designer Bill Atkinson defended the commercial practice of copyrighting and selling software. Bill Gates is a notable example of the proprietary model of software development. By the mid-1980s (the time of the Hackers’ Conference), the commercial model was winning out. The attendants were only able to agree that “the free dissemination of information was a worthy ideal,” and never could reach a consensus on the correct approach to face the upcoming challenges of the software industry. As we now know, the commercialization of the software and information industry is the dominant business model. The laws suits by music, movie and software companies against average consumer who have “illegally” downloaded the companies copyrighted material through peer-to-peer (Free software) networks is an example of how seriously corporate America is about protecting their property. With few examples—Linux and Sakai, among others—the idealism of the early days of computerization has given way to American way of capitalism.
Neff’s essay explores the transition of New York’s “Silicon Alley” from the bohemian art and content driving Web sites to the profit driven sites of online advertising companies and business oriented software businesses. Neff’s argues that the transition was not only driven by the external influences of the financial markets and investors, but the shift was in the change of cultural values within Silicon Alley itself. Neff examines the parties, gatherings, and events of Silicon Alley to explore the changing social and culture networks of New York’s Internet industry.
By looking at who attended which events from 1997 to 2001 using the “Cyberscene” social column of the online trade publication AtNewYork, Neff was able to see a trend in the institutional make-up of the event attendees. Early on the events were attended by start-ups, Internet content and art sites with no representation of financial interests, but by 1999 the arts were relegated to a minimal role and other industries—financial, TV-Radio-Film, and PR and Advertising) made up the networking block with start-ups and Internet content. Neff argues this shift occurred before the heavy investment of Internet companies.
It also illustrates another example of how the capitalism and commercial interests usurp the idealism of the early Internet entrepreneurs. Now gone are the original art sites, with their ideas of art for art’s sake (ada’web, The Blue Dot and Rhizomes) or desires to promote high culture (Word.com and Urban Desire), and what remains are the DoubleClick’s (online advertising). Neff states:
…when Silicon Alley began to experience financial success it coincided with the destruction of the diversity of company types in the industry, as culturally oriented sites were scuttled and digital advertising firms, e-commerce firms, and consulting firms began to gain recognition in financial realms (296).
One final note, I find it interesting that in both of the essays it is offline events that help to define the participants. In Turner’s essay, it is the first Hackers’ Conference that defines the hackers’ identity. In Neff’s essay, it is social networks and events that define the power and cultural shifts of the New York Internet industry. As Neff writes, “face-to-face business meetings remain important to Silicon Alley.”
This week’s paper has been inspired by two of the readings from Critical Cyberculture Studies (Eds. Silver & Massanari, 2006), Fred Turner’s essay “How Digital Technology Found Utopian Ideology: Lessons from the First Hackers’ Conference,” and Gina Neff’s “ Associating Independents: Business Relationships and the Culture of Independence in the Dot-Com Era.” Turner explores the development of utopian information ideology by examining hackers of the 1970s and 1980s and the events of the 1984 Hackers’ Conference. The media myth of hackers is that they are loners and late-night prowlers, additionally they are portrayed as warriors in fight between commercialization of information, software and the Internet and the “Free software” movement or as I know it the “Open source” movement—Linux (OS) and Sakai (collaboration software) are current examples). Based on the six values of the hacker ethic (Levy, Steven. 1984. Hackers: Heroes of the computer revolution), early hackers began the creation of a utopian view of their work
- Access to computers—and anything which might teach you something about the way the world works—should be unlimited and total.
- All information should be free.
- Mistrust Authority—Promote Decentralization.
- Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as degrees, age, race, or position.
- You can create art and beauty on a computer.
- Computers can change your life for the better.
These early hackers were primarily working for major research institutes as MIT and Stanford. I would suggest that it is easy of promote the free diffusion of technology when you are employed by a university and funded by government grants.
Not all feel into the “Free software” camp, Turner points out that Macintosh designer Bill Atkinson defended the commercial practice of copyrighting and selling software. Bill Gates is a notable example of the proprietary model of software development. By the mid-1980s (the time of the Hackers’ Conference), the commercial model was winning out. The attendants were only able to agree that “the free dissemination of information was a worthy ideal,” and never could reach a consensus on the correct approach to face the upcoming challenges of the software industry. As we now know, the commercialization of the software and information industry is the dominant business model. The laws suits by music, movie and software companies against average consumer who have “illegally” downloaded the companies copyrighted material through peer-to-peer (Free software) networks is an example of how seriously corporate America is about protecting their property. With few examples—Linux and Sakai, among others—the idealism of the early days of computerization has given way to American way of capitalism.
Neff’s essay explores the transition of New York’s “Silicon Alley” from the bohemian art and content driving Web sites to the profit driven sites of online advertising companies and business oriented software businesses. Neff’s argues that the transition was not only driven by the external influences of the financial markets and investors, but the shift was in the change of cultural values within Silicon Alley itself. Neff examines the parties, gatherings, and events of Silicon Alley to explore the changing social and culture networks of New York’s Internet industry.
By looking at who attended which events from 1997 to 2001 using the “Cyberscene” social column of the online trade publication AtNewYork, Neff was able to see a trend in the institutional make-up of the event attendees. Early on the events were attended by start-ups, Internet content and art sites with no representation of financial interests, but by 1999 the arts were relegated to a minimal role and other industries—financial, TV-Radio-Film, and PR and Advertising) made up the networking block with start-ups and Internet content. Neff argues this shift occurred before the heavy investment of Internet companies.
It also illustrates another example of how the capitalism and commercial interests usurp the idealism of the early Internet entrepreneurs. Now gone are the original art sites, with their ideas of art for art’s sake (ada’web, The Blue Dot and Rhizomes) or desires to promote high culture (Word.com and Urban Desire), and what remains are the DoubleClick’s (online advertising). Neff states:
…when Silicon Alley began to experience financial success it coincided with the destruction of the diversity of company types in the industry, as culturally oriented sites were scuttled and digital advertising firms, e-commerce firms, and consulting firms began to gain recognition in financial realms (296).
One final note, I find it interesting that in both of the essays it is offline events that help to define the participants. In Turner’s essay, it is the first Hackers’ Conference that defines the hackers’ identity. In Neff’s essay, it is social networks and events that define the power and cultural shifts of the New York Internet industry. As Neff writes, “face-to-face business meetings remain important to Silicon Alley.”
Thought Paper: October 18
I have concluded that I am one of the few New Media guys that do not believe the new democratic Cyber-Utopia. I do not see evidence of the new engaged voter, the institutional transparency or free-flowing public discourse made possible by technological innovation. In New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen, Philip N. Howard explores the evolution of “hypermedia campaigns,” the people behind them, and the social and culture issues involving the campaigns and the technology they utilize. Howard’s treatment is a sober and shies away from the typical hyper-euphoria hype of current New Media studies. He may well share my unUtopian views.
Unlike many of the readings we have had, Howard looks at the impact of the actions of the decision makers—the campaign managers, strategists, and programmers. One decision is data mining—the collection of personal data from multiple sources, data originally collected of other purposes—and a practice considered by many to be outside privacy norms. The second decision is to use the mined data to narrowcast the campaigns message by tailoring the message the web site viewer will see when they are online. Without letting the viewer know of the tailored content, the practice could easily be considered deceptive and propagandizing.
Why should these practices surprise anyone? Advertising and public relations have been using this type of data for years, the Internet just makes it easier to gather and distribute (DataBank.com). In the past, candidates tailored the campaign’s message to each town or group they visited; each speech reflected the interests of a particular audience. Now the programmable nature of the Internet makes it easier for the campaigns to deliver customized and targeted information to the web site’s audience.
Other components of “hypermedia campaigns” are the development of software applications by the New Media providers. Though some of the examples Howard gives, like streaming video, eCommerce solutions and possibly even the data mining solutions, could as easily trace their origins to the porn industry. Again, this is not a new occurrence for media systems—Ben Franklin developed better ink for printing and early television and filmmakers developed better equipment and processes—so why should the new medium be different. Innovation is always a component of early media development. More instant feedback to the campaign is another component of politicking on the Internet; campaign managers enjoy the immediacy of the feedback to allow the candidate to alter the message as the campaign develops.
There is no denying the Internet makes many of the tasks needed for campaigning easier to accomplish and implement, it makes it easier voters to access candidate information and for voters to communicate their wishes and needs to the politicians. Like television, radio, films, and newspapers before it, the Internet—when used responsibly and effectively—is a great tool for disseminating information and engaging voters in the electoral process. Just do not expect it to create an upwelling of electoral pride, participation and wide spread democratic engagement.
Unlike many of the readings we have had, Howard looks at the impact of the actions of the decision makers—the campaign managers, strategists, and programmers. One decision is data mining—the collection of personal data from multiple sources, data originally collected of other purposes—and a practice considered by many to be outside privacy norms. The second decision is to use the mined data to narrowcast the campaigns message by tailoring the message the web site viewer will see when they are online. Without letting the viewer know of the tailored content, the practice could easily be considered deceptive and propagandizing.
Why should these practices surprise anyone? Advertising and public relations have been using this type of data for years, the Internet just makes it easier to gather and distribute (DataBank.com). In the past, candidates tailored the campaign’s message to each town or group they visited; each speech reflected the interests of a particular audience. Now the programmable nature of the Internet makes it easier for the campaigns to deliver customized and targeted information to the web site’s audience.
Other components of “hypermedia campaigns” are the development of software applications by the New Media providers. Though some of the examples Howard gives, like streaming video, eCommerce solutions and possibly even the data mining solutions, could as easily trace their origins to the porn industry. Again, this is not a new occurrence for media systems—Ben Franklin developed better ink for printing and early television and filmmakers developed better equipment and processes—so why should the new medium be different. Innovation is always a component of early media development. More instant feedback to the campaign is another component of politicking on the Internet; campaign managers enjoy the immediacy of the feedback to allow the candidate to alter the message as the campaign develops.
There is no denying the Internet makes many of the tasks needed for campaigning easier to accomplish and implement, it makes it easier voters to access candidate information and for voters to communicate their wishes and needs to the politicians. Like television, radio, films, and newspapers before it, the Internet—when used responsibly and effectively—is a great tool for disseminating information and engaging voters in the electoral process. Just do not expect it to create an upwelling of electoral pride, participation and wide spread democratic engagement.
Thought Paper: October 5
It seems that actual research is catching up with the study of New Media. Slowly the analysis of the Internet’s role in society is moving away from questionable data, shoddy methodology, or mere conjecture. The age of reason and empirical investigation is beginning to dawn over the cyber-landscape. This is a common thread through many of the readings for this week from Society Online: The Internet in Context (Howard, P. N., & Jones, S. (eds.), 2004). As the early mass media was feared for its “magic bullet” effects on the public, so to the Internet has suffered from the extreme bi-polar predictions of cyber-Utopia and virtual singing of “Kumbaya” by handholding Avatars to ruin and collapse of the world and civilization as we know it.
As Rice and Katz, determined in “The Internet and Political Involvement in 1996 and 2000,” the Internet had a mild impact on the 1996 and 2000 elections, and by extension, our political life and/or our democratic system. Internet usage or lack of usage was not associated with increased political involvement. The offline politically uninterested will most likely remain uninterested online. Cyber-life follows real life.
In “The Bridging and Bonding Role of Online Communities” by Pippa Norris, the data reveals that online communities have not replaced the face-to-face interaction of individuals and groups. As with Elana Larsen’s findings in “Deeper Understanding, Deeper Ties: Taking Faith Online,” online communities and religious groups are mildly affective at bonding like-minded individuals and slightly less affective at bridging individuals with differences. The role of these online communities is to augment the physical relationship – with ease of information gathering through communal Web sites and interpersonal communication through email – not to replace them. People have not abandoned their houses of worship to join boundless spiritual enclaves anymore than hate Web sites have attracted new membership (see Southern Poverty Laws Center study) to enclaves of hatred and bigotry. Socially and ideologically homogeneous people will gather, online or offline, and the adventurous will seek out the diverse. Cyber-life follows real life.
As these studies reveal, the Internet is not the pantisocracy or the Pandora’s box that early “visionaries” predicted. It is showing itself simply as a new tool in the age-old activity of communication—interpersonal or mass. Granted this communication is quicker, Interactive and features some cool shiny add-ons, but at the end of the day, it is still the communication mankind has be practicing since our first grunts. Cyber-life follows real life.
As Rice and Katz, determined in “The Internet and Political Involvement in 1996 and 2000,” the Internet had a mild impact on the 1996 and 2000 elections, and by extension, our political life and/or our democratic system. Internet usage or lack of usage was not associated with increased political involvement. The offline politically uninterested will most likely remain uninterested online. Cyber-life follows real life.
In “The Bridging and Bonding Role of Online Communities” by Pippa Norris, the data reveals that online communities have not replaced the face-to-face interaction of individuals and groups. As with Elana Larsen’s findings in “Deeper Understanding, Deeper Ties: Taking Faith Online,” online communities and religious groups are mildly affective at bonding like-minded individuals and slightly less affective at bridging individuals with differences. The role of these online communities is to augment the physical relationship – with ease of information gathering through communal Web sites and interpersonal communication through email – not to replace them. People have not abandoned their houses of worship to join boundless spiritual enclaves anymore than hate Web sites have attracted new membership (see Southern Poverty Laws Center study) to enclaves of hatred and bigotry. Socially and ideologically homogeneous people will gather, online or offline, and the adventurous will seek out the diverse. Cyber-life follows real life.
As these studies reveal, the Internet is not the pantisocracy or the Pandora’s box that early “visionaries” predicted. It is showing itself simply as a new tool in the age-old activity of communication—interpersonal or mass. Granted this communication is quicker, Interactive and features some cool shiny add-ons, but at the end of the day, it is still the communication mankind has be practicing since our first grunts. Cyber-life follows real life.
Thought Paper: September 27
Johnette Hawkins McCrery and John E. Newhagen’s “Conceptual Elasticity of the Public Sphere: Tracking Media and Psychological Determinants of Access” (E. P. Bucy & J. E. Newhagen (Eds.), Media Access, 2004) makes an interesting case for a conceptual expansion of J. Habermas’ “Public Sphere” (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 1989). Habermas described the public sphere as the space where citizens gather and there is an exchange of political discourse and ideas. According to Habermas, the space for this public affairs deliberation was the coffeehouses and salons of 18th century Paris. The new moneyed middle class was increasing seeking access to policy-making circles long monopolized by the ruling power elite.
McCrery and Newhagen state the nature of the public sphere, as a physical space for political discourse remains a popular concept. They point out that critics depict the American policy process as becoming more detached from public opinion, a process where professional bureaucratic and technocratic power elites increasingly create policy and in the process increasingly marginalize the citizenry.
McCrery and Newhagen suggest that this trend calls for the rethinking of the static public sphere model. They propose that the sphere be conceptually split in two, one sphere is the “opinion sphere,” a forum where citizens gather for political and public affairs dialogues, and the second sphere is the “process sphere,” the arena here policymaking decisions are actually made. Where as Habermas, defined public sphere a physical space, the authors theorize that the two sphere can actual occur in different states of reality—physical and virtual—depending on the size on the participant pool and the participants view on interactive discourse. Populating the process sphere is a relatively small number of individuals—the power elite—who are congressional members, congressional staffers, or lobbyists. These participants look at interpersonal and newspapers as interactive means of communication and are confined to a small geographic area—Washington, DC. The small number of members allows a more physical arena of discourse to be effective.
Making up the opinion sphere is “likely” voters—non-elites—and includes a large, diverse group of individuals that are or can be geographically distant from one another. This group views interactivity differently and favor medium such talk radio and the Internet as more responsive to their ideas. The opinion sphere can exist as a physical local or a virtual space.
The McCrery and Newhagen study, indicated that these two spheres do exist and that the assumed participants do populate the appropriate spheres—power elite in the process sphere and non-elites in the opinion sphere and that each sphere does have a media preference—newspapers for the power elite and talk radio for the non-elites. The study also shows that there is overlap between the two spheres indicating a flow of opinion to policy action and back.
The study or rather the question the study wishes to explore I found to be interesting and useful in probing the model of public opinion, political participation, and policymaking. The original “public sphere” model as defined by Habermas, seems too rigid and static to explain the role of political empowerment, but is a relevant conceptual foundation on which to stand. McCrery and Newhagen make a good attempt at moving beyond the idealized concept and exploring an intriguing real world question.
As a beginning exploration, I find the study useful though limiting in its sample and its media assumptions. I question the narrow definition of the power elite—congressional members, congressional staffers, or lobbyists—and it leaves out corporate leaders, government agency or department heads and staffers, and state government leaders, to name a few. It also defined political participation as having held any elected office—including non-governmental ones such as high school offices and civic organizations, but excluding appointed office or NGOs—but does not account for working on campaigns or just politically engaged non-official leaders within a community. I would like to see a more inclusive media selection that includes Internet sites and television. I find it interesting that the primary media studied are two of the oldest “traditional” media—newspapers and radio.
I find the notion that the public sphere is actual multiple spheres—including, but not limited to the two spheres proposed in the study— that intercept and interact with one another a more elastic model to examine public and political discourse. The multi-sphere model would allow for changes we are seeing in society now and would be adaptive to future changes. Throw in a bit of popular culture and resistant communities theory and McCrery and Newhagen may be on to something.
McCrery and Newhagen state the nature of the public sphere, as a physical space for political discourse remains a popular concept. They point out that critics depict the American policy process as becoming more detached from public opinion, a process where professional bureaucratic and technocratic power elites increasingly create policy and in the process increasingly marginalize the citizenry.
McCrery and Newhagen suggest that this trend calls for the rethinking of the static public sphere model. They propose that the sphere be conceptually split in two, one sphere is the “opinion sphere,” a forum where citizens gather for political and public affairs dialogues, and the second sphere is the “process sphere,” the arena here policymaking decisions are actually made. Where as Habermas, defined public sphere a physical space, the authors theorize that the two sphere can actual occur in different states of reality—physical and virtual—depending on the size on the participant pool and the participants view on interactive discourse. Populating the process sphere is a relatively small number of individuals—the power elite—who are congressional members, congressional staffers, or lobbyists. These participants look at interpersonal and newspapers as interactive means of communication and are confined to a small geographic area—Washington, DC. The small number of members allows a more physical arena of discourse to be effective.
Making up the opinion sphere is “likely” voters—non-elites—and includes a large, diverse group of individuals that are or can be geographically distant from one another. This group views interactivity differently and favor medium such talk radio and the Internet as more responsive to their ideas. The opinion sphere can exist as a physical local or a virtual space.
The McCrery and Newhagen study, indicated that these two spheres do exist and that the assumed participants do populate the appropriate spheres—power elite in the process sphere and non-elites in the opinion sphere and that each sphere does have a media preference—newspapers for the power elite and talk radio for the non-elites. The study also shows that there is overlap between the two spheres indicating a flow of opinion to policy action and back.
The study or rather the question the study wishes to explore I found to be interesting and useful in probing the model of public opinion, political participation, and policymaking. The original “public sphere” model as defined by Habermas, seems too rigid and static to explain the role of political empowerment, but is a relevant conceptual foundation on which to stand. McCrery and Newhagen make a good attempt at moving beyond the idealized concept and exploring an intriguing real world question.
As a beginning exploration, I find the study useful though limiting in its sample and its media assumptions. I question the narrow definition of the power elite—congressional members, congressional staffers, or lobbyists—and it leaves out corporate leaders, government agency or department heads and staffers, and state government leaders, to name a few. It also defined political participation as having held any elected office—including non-governmental ones such as high school offices and civic organizations, but excluding appointed office or NGOs—but does not account for working on campaigns or just politically engaged non-official leaders within a community. I would like to see a more inclusive media selection that includes Internet sites and television. I find it interesting that the primary media studied are two of the oldest “traditional” media—newspapers and radio.
I find the notion that the public sphere is actual multiple spheres—including, but not limited to the two spheres proposed in the study— that intercept and interact with one another a more elastic model to examine public and political discourse. The multi-sphere model would allow for changes we are seeing in society now and would be adaptive to future changes. Throw in a bit of popular culture and resistant communities theory and McCrery and Newhagen may be on to something.
Thought Paper: September 20
I have heard that the definition of “insanity” is the act to repeating the same action, but expecting different results. Well, this thought kept going through my head as I read this week's chapters from Media Access. Early predictions of Internet adoption were overly optimistic, and the early research suggested that physical access was the primary barrier to adoption. If you get the wires strung and the terminals—television-based or computer—into the homes, schools, and work place everyone will begin traveling on the digital information super highway, it was the “Field of Dreams” "build it and they will come" approach to Internet accessibility.
So government agencies have funded Internet in library access programs, foundations have funded schools and community centers, and local governments, such LaGrange, GA, have created there own initiatives (p. 131)—Austin and San Marcos, TX are both exploring citywide free WiFi access—but the results are still the same. There is still a significant portion of the American population (Pew, 2000) not connected to the Internet and a percentage of them have no interest in connecting. Most of this week’s chapters try to explore with the whys behind non-adoption. Moreover, to be honest, most of these studies just left me at the door. I mean, is it significant to the literature on New Media studies to know that a user’s personality will indicate their level of willingness to adopt new technologies (p.73), or that peer pressure, parental influence and conflicting messages from authority figures and the media can hinder adoption (p. 107). These conditions have been restricting and influencing media adoption from the beginning of mass media. Yes, it's more complex in its structure and interactivity, but why would New Media technologies fundamentally cause unique reactions?
Now, the article that deals with Internet user frustration and its impact on usage and continued adoption seems more appropriate (p. 47). Studying what leads to user frustration and their adaptive or non-adaptive reactions to these stimuli seems like a worthy area of inquiry. The finding that interactivity can actually create disorientation for the user and this in turn can lead to the user choosing to not access the technology is fascinating. Interactivity is a fundamental characteristic of the Internet and maybe a significant component in user non-adoption. By adding more links, video, or audio to a web site and actually causing disorientation to a percentage of site user is an interesting research topic and a practical bit of information to know when designing a web experience.
Much of this rant comes from my opinion that expecting the Internet will act significantly different from other media is flawed. Even television—over 50 years from its introduction—does not have 100% penetration and adoption, so why would you be surprised that the internet does not have a greater adoption rate after only 10 years? Additionally, Agenda Setting theory suggests that peer and parental pressure (opinion leaders) can influence the actions or opinions of a medium user. Again, why would Internet users or potential users and their usage be immune?
So government agencies have funded Internet in library access programs, foundations have funded schools and community centers, and local governments, such LaGrange, GA, have created there own initiatives (p. 131)—Austin and San Marcos, TX are both exploring citywide free WiFi access—but the results are still the same. There is still a significant portion of the American population (Pew, 2000) not connected to the Internet and a percentage of them have no interest in connecting. Most of this week’s chapters try to explore with the whys behind non-adoption. Moreover, to be honest, most of these studies just left me at the door. I mean, is it significant to the literature on New Media studies to know that a user’s personality will indicate their level of willingness to adopt new technologies (p.73), or that peer pressure, parental influence and conflicting messages from authority figures and the media can hinder adoption (p. 107). These conditions have been restricting and influencing media adoption from the beginning of mass media. Yes, it's more complex in its structure and interactivity, but why would New Media technologies fundamentally cause unique reactions?
Now, the article that deals with Internet user frustration and its impact on usage and continued adoption seems more appropriate (p. 47). Studying what leads to user frustration and their adaptive or non-adaptive reactions to these stimuli seems like a worthy area of inquiry. The finding that interactivity can actually create disorientation for the user and this in turn can lead to the user choosing to not access the technology is fascinating. Interactivity is a fundamental characteristic of the Internet and maybe a significant component in user non-adoption. By adding more links, video, or audio to a web site and actually causing disorientation to a percentage of site user is an interesting research topic and a practical bit of information to know when designing a web experience.
Much of this rant comes from my opinion that expecting the Internet will act significantly different from other media is flawed. Even television—over 50 years from its introduction—does not have 100% penetration and adoption, so why would you be surprised that the internet does not have a greater adoption rate after only 10 years? Additionally, Agenda Setting theory suggests that peer and parental pressure (opinion leaders) can influence the actions or opinions of a medium user. Again, why would Internet users or potential users and their usage be immune?
Thought Paper: September 13
Of the essays (chapters) in Critical Cyberculture Studies for this week's readings, Beth Kolko’s “Cultural Considerations in Internet Policy and Design: A Case Study from Central Asia” really hit home with me. My background in design and my cynical view of the American-centric our-way-is-the-best-way approach to dealing with the rest of the world made me receptive to Kolko’s argument that culturally appropriate design (often overlooked and understudied) can be a “powerful avenue for intervention.”
Often the debate about adoption and use of information and communication technology (ICT) is only about cables and computers. It is a “build it, they will come” attitude, without considering the broader social and community norms and conventions. The author uses her work and research in Central Asia as a case study of technology usage in a non-Western society. A society without the assumptions and meanings of Western metaphors and iconology; so she asks, is the Windows' desktop interface—with its filing cabinet, folders and trash can—the most appropriate graphic user interface (GUI) for a non-American/European to use to interact with the technology? For that matter, is it the most useful metaphor for America’s rural, blue collar or the economically disadvantaged people to use for accessing and interacting with computers?
Everett Rogers describes the process of diffusion as a series of steps a population takes to make the move from non-users to users. First, the innovators become users, followed by early adopters, early majority, late majority, and finally laggards. Rogers describes innovators as being risk takers and are willing to adapt to systems that are outside of traditional social norms. Kolko suggests that good design should be geared to late stage adopters through to the laggards, the very people that the advocates of ICT are trying to reach, and not to the risk takers and innovators.
The essay reminded me of the One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) program that is working to provide computers to children in third world countries. One of its challenges was to recreate the user experience, as its website states:
Design will not solve all of the digital divide issues—infrastructure and hardware is still an obstacle to adoption—but design can help to bridge the gap. As long as the individual and a community is expected to adapt to the pro-Western system of metaphors in order to use ICT, there will always be laggards, resisters and non-adopters. Maybe it is time to stop expecting the world to march to America’s technological drumbeat.
Often the debate about adoption and use of information and communication technology (ICT) is only about cables and computers. It is a “build it, they will come” attitude, without considering the broader social and community norms and conventions. The author uses her work and research in Central Asia as a case study of technology usage in a non-Western society. A society without the assumptions and meanings of Western metaphors and iconology; so she asks, is the Windows' desktop interface—with its filing cabinet, folders and trash can—the most appropriate graphic user interface (GUI) for a non-American/European to use to interact with the technology? For that matter, is it the most useful metaphor for America’s rural, blue collar or the economically disadvantaged people to use for accessing and interacting with computers?
Everett Rogers describes the process of diffusion as a series of steps a population takes to make the move from non-users to users. First, the innovators become users, followed by early adopters, early majority, late majority, and finally laggards. Rogers describes innovators as being risk takers and are willing to adapt to systems that are outside of traditional social norms. Kolko suggests that good design should be geared to late stage adopters through to the laggards, the very people that the advocates of ICT are trying to reach, and not to the risk takers and innovators.
The essay reminded me of the One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) program that is working to provide computers to children in third world countries. One of its challenges was to recreate the user experience, as its website states:
The desktop metaphor is so entrenched in personal computer users' collective consciousness that it is easy to forget what a bold and radical innovation the Graphical User Interface (GUI) was and how it helped free the computer from the “professionals” who were appalled at the idea of computing for everyone.Not only is the hardware important for this new venture, but the OLPC needed to radically rethink the metaphors and icons that the children would use to interact and utilize the technology. Instead of forcing the children to adapt to the old metaphor of the desktop in order to successfully use the laptops, the new OLPC GUI would adapt to the community—multi-languages, icons based on international symbols—and the goal of the laptops to facilitate learning and collaboration—icons that visually represent the community of laptops (users) and activities being joined, not an office or business environment.
OLPC is about to revolutionize the existing concept of a computer interface.
Beginning with Seymour Papert's simple observation that children are knowledge workers like any adult, only more so, we decided they needed a user-interface tailored to their specific type of knowledge work: learning. So…we created SUGAR, a “zoom” interface that graphically captures their world of fellow learners and teachers as collaborators, emphasizing the connections within the community, among people, and their activities. (link)
Design will not solve all of the digital divide issues—infrastructure and hardware is still an obstacle to adoption—but design can help to bridge the gap. As long as the individual and a community is expected to adapt to the pro-Western system of metaphors in order to use ICT, there will always be laggards, resisters and non-adopters. Maybe it is time to stop expecting the world to march to America’s technological drumbeat.
Thought Paper: September 6
The digital divide, cyberculture, media access, online research methodology, new media, Internet or internet, media usage, online commerce, virtual societies, online surveys, the politicizing of new technologies, and as the King of Siam would say “etc., etc., etc.” Will more broadband connections and computers enable more people to use the Internet? If we educate older persons on the use of new technologies, will there be an improvement in their lives? Do we need other people to contact us 24/7 with a touch of a button? Cell phones, computers, Blackberries, the Internet, iPhones—are they enabling or constraining? These topics, concepts, and questions are just a few of what new media research is studying.
Are these ramblings of a Luddite? No, I embrace new media. I have taught new media design and I use new media technologies, but one brief statement from the Media Access preface peeks my curiosity:
Does new media usage and adoption have more to do with factors of sociology, and culture than just availability and access? Why have the new media technologies not been universally adopted? Why are thousands of blogs being created daily and then quickly abandoned by their creators? Are we expecting the Internet and other technologies to follow the path set by television, radio, and newspapers? Is using the models and paradigms of traditional media studies an appropriate approach to view and study new media and cyberculture? New media communication defies simple classification—is it a tool of mass or interpersonal communication, education or entertainment, self-expression or mass conformity, or is it the voice of the masses or the power elite.
It seems that much of the recent study of new media focuses on the systems and technologies; I look forward to the search of why people choose to use the technology and why they choose one technology while ignoring another. My and my wife’s usage of and adoption of various new media illustrate many of the questions raised in the field. I have designed and taught the design of Web sites for the last six years, yet in our household we continued to use dial-up service even thought broadband was readily available. I have used a cell phone for many years, but my wife has only recently acquired one and still resists using it. I have created a blog and must admit I fall into the category of those that have done little to continually update it. I have pages on social networks, such as Facebook.com and MySpace.com, and an avatar in Second Life, yet have largely abandoned my participation.
The readings talk to the complexity of the issues surrounding the study of new media and new media technologies. As David Silver states in Critical Cyberculture Studies:
If merely naming the field is complex and a challenge, studying this field will at least be interesting.
Are these ramblings of a Luddite? No, I embrace new media. I have taught new media design and I use new media technologies, but one brief statement from the Media Access preface peeks my curiosity:
Yet there are indications that [Internet] adoption has reached a plateau, with some new users opting out of the cyberworld after a period of initial, frustrating use…. Despite its popularity, the Internet does not appear to be an economically self-sustaining medium in the sense that mass media such as television and newspapers are. We suspect this may have more to do with the user’s ability to benefit from the content than physical access to technology (p. x).
Does new media usage and adoption have more to do with factors of sociology, and culture than just availability and access? Why have the new media technologies not been universally adopted? Why are thousands of blogs being created daily and then quickly abandoned by their creators? Are we expecting the Internet and other technologies to follow the path set by television, radio, and newspapers? Is using the models and paradigms of traditional media studies an appropriate approach to view and study new media and cyberculture? New media communication defies simple classification—is it a tool of mass or interpersonal communication, education or entertainment, self-expression or mass conformity, or is it the voice of the masses or the power elite.
It seems that much of the recent study of new media focuses on the systems and technologies; I look forward to the search of why people choose to use the technology and why they choose one technology while ignoring another. My and my wife’s usage of and adoption of various new media illustrate many of the questions raised in the field. I have designed and taught the design of Web sites for the last six years, yet in our household we continued to use dial-up service even thought broadband was readily available. I have used a cell phone for many years, but my wife has only recently acquired one and still resists using it. I have created a blog and must admit I fall into the category of those that have done little to continually update it. I have pages on social networks, such as Facebook.com and MySpace.com, and an avatar in Second Life, yet have largely abandoned my participation.
The readings talk to the complexity of the issues surrounding the study of new media and new media technologies. As David Silver states in Critical Cyberculture Studies:
Internet studies. New media studies. Digital media studies. Digital arts and culture studies. Cyberculture studies. Critical cyberculture studies. Networked culture studies. Informatics. Information science. Information society studies. Contemporary media studies.
Naming, not to mention mapping, an academic field is a tricky proposition (p. 1).
If merely naming the field is complex and a challenge, studying this field will at least be interesting.
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